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I. INTRODUCTION
Two individuals working for the same employer voluntarily engage
in a sexual relationship. One of the employees is the direct supervisor of
the other. On a given occasion, the two individuals are working together
when the supervisor suggests that the two of them go to dinner and a
movie. At the end of the evening, when the two are about to part com-
pany, the supervisor tries to kiss the other employee good night. How-
ever, the employee tells the supervisor that this type of behavior is inap-
propriate and the supervisor apologizes and promises never to do it
again.
Nonetheless, the two continue to spend time together, both on and
off of company time. The employee visits the supervisor's apartment and
even accepts a key to the apartment. Notwithstanding the employee's
earlier refusal to submit to the supervisor's advances, the two eventually
engage in intimate relations. The relationship continues for a period of
time and at no point does the employee report any of the supervisor's
conduct to the employer. However, after the situation in the work envi-
ronment takes a turn for the worse, the employee makes a sexual harass-
ment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The em-
ployee argues that the advances were unwelcome. The only reason the
employee provides for submitting to the supervisor's advances was that it
was an effort to remain in good standing with the employer. In other
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words, the employee allegedly feared that termination would result
unless the employee submitted to the supervisor's advances.
This illustration provides just one example of the myriad ways that
a voluntary sexual relationship can evolve between an employee and a
supervisor. Only two circuit courts-the Second and the Ninth-have
addressed whether an employer can be held vicariously liable in a situa-
tion such as that presented by this hypothetical.2 More specifically, the
Second and Ninth Circuits are the only circuits to address whether an
employee's voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances con-
stitutes a "tangible employment action," thereby precluding use of the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense against the employee's Title VII
claim.3
This Article argues that the employer should not be held vicariously
liable for an employee's voluntary submission to sexual advances simply
because the alleged harasser is a supervisor. Instead, liability under these
circumstances should be determined on a case-by-case basis using a neg-
ligence standard. Moreover, this Article argues that where voluntary
submission is involved, the courts should impose individual liability in-
stead of vicarious liability. This proposal is predicated on the assumption
that responsibility for voluntary relationships should be vested primarily
in the supervisors and subordinates, not (in most cases) in the employers.
This does not mean, however, that an employee coerced into a sexual
relationship with a supervisor should have no legal recourse.
It is somewhat radical to suggest that an employer should not be
held vicariously liable for an employee's voluntary submission to sexual
advances where the alleged harasser is a supervisor, and this approach is
a marked departure from existing assumptions regarding sexual harass-
ment. Most decisions and writings on the topic have imposed-under a
traditional agency theory-vicarious liability upon the employer for the
sexually harassing conduct of its supervisors. 4 Specifically, courts ad-
dressing this issue have held that "[t]here is no question that a 'tangible
employment action' occurs when a supervisor abuses his authority to act
on his employer's behalf by threatening to fire a subordinate if she re-
fuses to participate in sexual acts with him, and then actually fires her
2. The Second Circuit addressed the issue in Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir.
2002); the Ninth Circuit addressed it in Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
3. The Faragher/Ellerth defense is an affirmative action defense synthesized from the Supreme
Court's decisions in both Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), both discussed in detail in Part 11, infra.
4. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 742; Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14
F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213 (1994).
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when she continues to resist his demands.",5 This Article goes against the
grain of both the cases analyzed and the scholarly articles written to date,
though the author nevertheless attempts balance by proposing that a su-
pervisor be jointly and/or severally liable with his employer for the dis-
criminatory or harassing conduct of the supervisor if the supervisor is
found to have engaged in sexual harassment. This proposal is fully con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decisions defining the scope of tangible
employment actions.6
Part II describes the historical background of sexual harassment
claims against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton7 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth.8 Part III presents the Second and Ninth Circuits' analyses deter-
mining that voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances con-
stitutes a tangible employment action, thereby precluding use of the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. Part IV analyzes the decisions of
the Second and Ninth Circuits and argues that voluntary submission does
not constitute a "tangible employment action." However, even if the
courts determine that voluntary submission does constitute a "tangible
employment action," this Article argues that the appropriate standard in
determining employer liability is a negligence standard. As such, the
employer should be entitled to assert the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative
defense in cases involving voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual
advances. Ohio courts apply a negligence standard, and this Part argues
that the Supreme Court should follow suit. Part V concludes the article,
noting that the imposition of a liability standard is consistent with Su-
preme Court precedent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Sexual Harassment Law
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 is a remedial statute de-
signed to protect employees from being subjected to discriminatory work
5. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1167.
6. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
7. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
8. 524 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1998).
9. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (2000) et seq.
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environments and discriminatory employment practices.' ° It prohibits
employers from discriminating against individuals with respect to com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Courts have been willing to
recognize a Title VII claim where harassment based on sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment, and when an employer conditions
employment benefits on the provision of sexual favors. ' 2
In Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished two types of sexual harassment claims that may expose an
employer to liability under Title VII: (1) harassment that creates an of-
fensive or hostile work environment, and (2) harassment involving the
exchange of employment benefits for sexual favors (quidpro quo).13 For
an employee to succeed on a hostile environment claim, the court made
clear that an employee had to establish that the harassment was severe or
pervasive.' 4 The Supreme Court eventually rejected the distinction be-
tween quidpro quo claims and hostile environment claims in 1998 when,
in two sexual harassment companion cases, it revisited the question of
employer liability for the harassing conduct of supervisory employees. 15
B. The Supreme Court's Decisions in Faragher and Ellerth
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that to properly
analyze whether an employer should be liable for a supervisor's harass-
ment, the cases should be divided into two categories: (1) cases involving
a "tangible employment action," and (2) cases involving no "tangible
employment action."'16 Under Faragher/Ellerth, where the supervisor's
harassment is accompanied by a tangible employment action, the em-
ployer is held vicariously liable for the acts of the supervisor.' 7 This is
because the courts have reasoned that the employer has a greater oppor-
tunity and duty to guard against supervisor misconduct than that of the
general worker. 8 On the other hand, where the supervisor's harassment
10. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("Title VII affords em-
ployees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult.").
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) (emphasis added).
12. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2005).
13. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66.
14. Id.
15. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
16. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-63; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777-78.
17. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777.
18. "The agency relationship affords contact with an employee subjected to a supervisor's
sexual harassment, and the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the whistle on
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is not accompanied by a tangible employment action, the employer is
entitled to the FaragherlEllerth affirmative defense.' 9  The
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is comprised of two elements: (1)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly cor-
rect any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the employee unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective oppor-
tunities provided by the employer. 20
For purposes of Title VII liability, the definition of the term "em-
ployer" includes "agents" of the employer. 2' It was Congress's intent that
courts look to agency principles in determining employer liability in sex-
ual harassment claims. 22 In Ellerth, the Supreme Court stated that when
an employee brings a claim seeking to impose vicarious liability upon an
employer for the acts of an individual acting in a supervisory capacity,
the "aided in agency relation" principle embodied in § 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency provides the appropriate starting point
for determining the employer's liability. 23 Section 219(2)(d) assigns vi-
carious liability to employers for intentional acts committed by supervi-
sors if the employee was aided in the agency relation in accomplishing
the tort.24
Accordingly, pursuant to Ellerth, when an employee brings a claim
seeking to impose vicarious liability upon an employer for the acts of a
supervisor, the "aided in agency relation" rule is the appropriate analy-
sis. 25 However, the Supreme Court explained that this standard alone is
not sufficient to give rise to employer liability for sexual harassment be-
cause most workplace harassers are aided by the employment relation-
ship simply by virtue of the proximity and regular contact they have with
a superior. When a person with supervisory authority discriminates in the terms and conditions of
subordinates' employment, his actions necessarily draw upon his superior position over the people
who report to him, or those under them, whereas an employee generally cannot check a supervisor's
abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-worker. When a fellow
employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult
to offer such responses to a supervisor, whose 'power to supervise-[which may be] to hire and fire,
and to set work schedules and pay rates does not disappear ... when he chooses to harass through
insults and offensive gestures rather than directly with threats of firing or promises of promotion."'
Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1284 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 959 (2004) (quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 854 (1991)).
19. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
20. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
22. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
23. Id. at 755.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
25. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759-60. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)
(1958).
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other employees.26 As such, something more is needed to impose vicari-
ous liability upon the employer. That something must be a tangible em-
ployment action against the employee by a supervisor with immediate or
successively higher authority over that employee.27 The Court's reason
for establishing this rule was that the supervisor's authority invests a cer-
tain threatening character in the harassment.28  Thus, after
Faragher/Ellerth, whether an employee suffered a tangible employment
action is a critical inquiry.
C. Post-Faragher/Ellerth: Tangible Employment Actions
After Faragher/Ellerth, an employer cannot escape liability when
harassment by a supervisor culminates in a tangible employment action.29
Under Ellerth, a tangible employment action "is a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign-
ment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits. ' '3° However, it appears that this list may
not be exhaustive. Had the Supreme Court meant this list to be exhaus-
tive, it would not have used the phrase "such as" before listing examples
of significant changes in employment status.3'
Therefore, to establish a tangible employment action, the employee
must show only that the supervisor made decisions affecting compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of the employee's job based on the
32employee's submission to the sexual advances. In most instances, a
tangible employment action inflicts direct economic harm, 33 though eco-
nomic harm is not required.34 For example, a tangible employment action
was found where an employee received inadequate training to meet the
35demands of and retain her position. A tangible employment action was
also found where an employer withheld choice assignments 36 and where
26. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 764.
29. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-63; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742, 777-78 (1998).
30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
31. See Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the use of the
words "such as" suggests "the definition given by the Supreme Court is non-exclusive"). See also
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The use of the qualifier 'such as' indicates that
tangible employment actions are not limited to those that follow the qualifier.").
32. Temores v. SG Cowen, 289 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000-01 (N.D. III. 2003).
33. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
34. Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
35. Carrero v. N.Y. Housing Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
36. Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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an employee was deprived of a fair evaluation of her job performance. 37
Economic harm or not, however, the action must have substantial conse-
quences; a temporary reduction in an employee's pay one year after she
reported a supervisor's alleged sexual harassment, for example, was
found not to constitute a tangible employment action.38 Additionally,
although a transfer could constitute a tangible employment action, it does
not when the employee requests the transfer.3 9
Recently, the Second and Ninth Circuits have expanded this list of
possible tangible employment actions by holding that a job benefit (such
as continued employment) that results from an employee's voluntary
submission to a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a tangible em-
ployment action. 40 Thus, the decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuits
expand the definition of tangible employment actions to include not only
actions resulting in adverse employment decisions, but also actions re-
sulting in tangible job benefits.
III. THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS' DECISIONS:
"TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT ACTION"
Only two circuit courts have directly addressed the issue of whether
an employee's voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances
constitutes a tangible employment action, thereby precluding the em-
ployer's use of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. 41 Both the Sec-
ond Circuit, in Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,42 and the
Ninth Circuit, in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology,43 con-
cluded that voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances con-
stitutes a tangible employment action. This Part analyzes how the Second
and Ninth Circuits arrived at this conclusion. Part IV will demonstrate
why the analyses of the Second and Ninth Circuits are incorrect.
A. The Second Circuit's Decision on Submission
as a "Tangible Employment Action"
The Second Circuit, in Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, was the first to address whether an employee's voluntary submis-
37. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 127 U.S.
539 (1994).
38. Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 510-11 (M.D. N.C. 2000).
39. Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27.
40. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93-99 (2d Cir. 2002); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of
Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1170-72 (9th Cir. 2003).
41. Jin, 310 F.3d at 100; Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1173.
42. Jin, 310 F.3d 84.
43. Holly D., 339 F.3d 1158.
Seattle University Law Review
sion to a supervisor's sexual advances constituted a tangible employment
action."a Min Jin sued her former employer, Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company (Met Life), alleging that she had been forced to submit to her
supervisor's sexual advances in return for retaining her employment in
violation of Title VII.45 Following a jury trial, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York entered a verdict of no li-
ability. 46 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court com-
mitted plain error when it did not include the supervisor's conditioning
of Jin's employment on her submission to his sexual advances in the list
of possible examples of tangible employment actions submitted to the
jury at the trial court level.47
Jin began her employment with Met Life in 1989 as a full-time life
insurance sales agent.48 Around May of 1993, Gregory Morabito, the
alleged harasser, began acting as Jin's manager and supervisor.49 From
May 1993 until June 1994, Morabito subjected Jin to sexually offensive
conduct.50 Morabito's conduct included: (1) making numerous offensive
sexual comments to Jin, both on and off of company time; (2) offen-
sively touching Jin's buttocks, breasts and legs; (3) requiring Jin to at-
tend weekly evening meetings in his locked office during which he
would physically threaten her, make sexual advances towards her, and
expose himself to her; and (4) repeatedly threatening to fire Jin if she
refused to submit to his sexual advances. 51 After months of acceding to
Morabito's sexual abuse in order to maintain her employment, Jin altered
her work schedule in order to avoid contact with him, and eventually re-
fused to attend private meetings in his office.52 Met Life terminated Jin's
employment in October of 1995; she subsequently filed a claim for sex-
ual harassment.53
44. 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2nd Cir. 2002).
45. Id. at 87-88.
46. Id. at 91.
47. Id. at 94. The court of appeals also held: (1) failure to include the withholding of an em-
ployee's checks in the list of possible "tangible employment actions" was prejudicial error; (2) use of
the term "adverse" in "tangible employment action" instruction was plain error; and (3) denial of
motion to amend complaint was not abuse of discretion. Id. at 93-98. However, because this Article
deals solely with the issue of whether voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances consti-
tutes a "tangible employment action," the Second Circuit's evaluation of these issues will not be
addressed.
48. Id. at 88.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 88-89.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 89.
53. Id. at 88-89.
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Prior to trial on Jin's sexual harassment claim, both parties pre-
sented proposed jury instructions to the district court. 54 Though Jin ob-
jected to several of Met Life's proposed jury instructions, the district
court ruled in favor of Met Life. 55 The district court entered a verdict of
no liability: the jury found that Jin had been subjected to unlawful har-
assment by her supervisor, but concluded that the harassment did not
result in a "tangible adverse action" affecting the terms or conditions of
56her employment.
Jin appealed,57 and the issue the court addressed was whether the
case involved a tangible employment action.58 This issue was critical be-
cause, had the jury found that a tangible employment action occurred as
a result of Morabito's harassment, Met Life would have been held vi-
cariously liable for his conduct and would not have been entitled to the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.59
In her appeal, Jin argued that the jury should have been instructed
that submission to Morabito's sexual advances in order to maintain her
employment was a possible tangible employment action.60 Jin argued
that her employment status was significantly changed as a result of Mo-
rabito requiring her, under threat of termination, to submit to his sexual
advances. 61 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the
district court committed plain error by omitting "submission to a supervi-
sor's sexual advances" from the examples of tangible employment ac-
tions included in the jury instructions.62 The court specifically stated that
the district court erred in narrowly defining tangible employment action
54. Id. at 89.
55. Id. at 89-90. The instructions eventually provided to the jury were as follows: "A 'tangible
adverse action' is a significant change in employment status. Minor incidents that cause mere incon-
venience and do not alter the actual amount of pay, benefits, duties or prestige, do not qualify as a
'tangible adverse action."' Id. at 90.
56. Id. at 87. However, as addressed by the Second Circuit in its opinion, the district court
erroneously used the phrase "tangible adverse action," as opposed to "tangible employment action"
in the jury instructions. Id. at 87 n.l.
57. Id. at 87.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 91-93.
60. Id. at 93. The instructions received by the jury defined a "tangible employment action" to
include the following: (1) "unjustifiably refusing to process policies sold by Jin"; (2) "unjustifiably
causing [Jin's] disability claim to be denied"; or (3) "unjustifiably firing her." Id. Jin also argued
that the jury instructions should have included the withholding of paychecks as a possible "tangible
employment action." Id. However, because this Article addresses only whether voluntary submis-
sion to a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a "tangible employment action," the court's hold-
ing with respect to that issue will not be addressed.
61. Id. at 94.
62. Id.
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to only the three specific actions listed in the jury instructions.63 As such,
it determined that Morabito's explicit conditioning of Jin's continued
employment on her submission to his sexual advances should have been
included in the jury instructions.64
The court concluded that Morabito's conduct "fit[] squarely within
the definition of 'tangible employment action' that the Supreme Court
announced in Faragher and Ellerth.,,65 The court reasoned that it was
Morabito's authority, as an agent of Met Life, which enabled him to
force Jin to submit to his sexual advances in order to maintain her em-
ployment.66 Moreover, the court reasoned that where the employee sub-
mits to a supervisor's advances in order to continue in employment, this
submission constitutes a tangible employment action because it is the
basis for allowing the employee to maintain employment.67
The Second Circuit reasoned that its holding was consistent with
the Circuit's pre-Faragher/Ellerth rule that "an employer is strictly liable
when a supervisor 'conditions any terms of employment upon the em-
ployee's submitting to unwelcome sexual advances., 68 In its pre-
Faragher/Ellerth decisions, the Second Circuit determined that Title VII
should not be read to punish victims of sexual harassment who surrender
to unwelcome sexual advances, as such a rule would encourage increased
persistence from harassers. 69 Accordingly, the rule in the Second Circuit
is that a significant change in employment status results when a supervi-
sor uses his or her authority in order to make decisions affecting the
terms and conditions of an employee's employment based upon his or
her submission to sexual advances. 70 With this rule, the Second Circuit
became the first circuit to hold that submission to a supervisor's sexual
advances constitutes a tangible employment action, thereby precluding
the employer's use of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense in such
situations.7'
63. Id. at 93. The Second Circuit also agreed that the district court erred by instructing the jury
that a "tangible employment action" must be adverse, as such instruction directly contradicts the
plain language of Faragher and Ellerth. Id.
64. Id. at 94.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 95 (quoting Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 512 U.S. 1213 (1994)).
69. Id. at 96.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 93-99.
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B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision on Submission
as a Tangible Employment Action
Shortly after the Second Circuit's holding in Jin that an employee's
voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a tan-
gible employment action, the Ninth Circuit addressed the same issue in
Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology.72 Holly D. sued her em-
ployer, California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech), and her supervisor
in state court alleging quidpro quo sexual harassment.7 3 The action was
removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, which granted summary judgment to Cal Tech on all claims
except the sexual assault claim against Holly D.'s supervisor.14 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit held, as the Second Circuit did in Jin, that an em-
ployee's voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances does
constitute a tangible employment action. 75 However, the Ninth Circuit
ultimately ruled in favor of Cal Tech on the issue. 6 The court's decision
was based on Holly D.'s failure to present sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on either of two issues: (1) whether her
supervisor threatened to terminate her employment if she failed to submit
to his sexual advances, or (2) whether he conditioned her continued em-
ployment on her submission to such advances.77
Holly D. began her employment at Cal Tech in 1992 as an adminis-
trative secretary.78 She was promoted to Senior Division Assistant for
Professor Stephen Wiggins in 1996. 79 Holly D. alleged that within one
year of her promotion, she commenced a sexual relationship with Wig-
72. 339 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2003).
73. Id. at 1165. The sexual harassment claim was brought under Title VII and California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act. Id.
74. Id. at 1165-66.
75. Id. at 1173. The court of appeals also held that: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct sexual harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm,
supporting the employer's affirmative defense of reasonable care; and (2) remand to the state court
was required for the state Fair Employment and Housing Act sexual assault and sexual battery
claims. Id. at 1181-82. However, because this Article deals solely with the issue of whether volun-
tary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a "tangible employment action," the
Ninth Circuit's evaluation of these issues will not be addressed.
76. Id. at 1173.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1162.
79. Id. As a condition of her promotion and transfer to a new department, Holly D. was placed
on a six-month probationary period, time during which she alleged that Wiggins occasionally looked
at her buttocks and breasts, made sexual comments towards her, and occasionally showed her porno-
graphic websites. Id. at 1162-63. Additionally, Holly D. alleged that Wiggins criticized her work
and threatened to extend her probationary period. Id. at 1163.
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gins because she felt it was necessary to submit to his sexual advances to
maintain her employment with Cal Tech.80 The sexual relationship be-
tween Wiggins and Holly D. continued for approximately one year. l
Holly D. based her Title VII claim upon Wiggins' conduct leading up to
her submission to his advances.8 2
Holly D. did not allege that Wiggins used physical force to coerce
sex, or that he explicitly threatened her job if she did not submit to his
advances. 3 Nevertheless, in stating her claim, Holly D. relied upon what
she considered indications that her continued employment depended on
her submission to Wiggins' advances.84 Holly D. contended that she was
forced to submit to Wiggins' sexual advances because doing so enabled
her to limit the effects of his "job-threatening criticisms.' ' s The district
court ultimately found that Holly D. had not suffered a tangible employ-
ment action because she had remained employed in her current position,
received regular salary increases, and was not denied any tangible job
benefit.8 6
However, in addressing Holly D.'s Title VII claim on appeal, the
Ninth Circuit stated that "there is no question that a 'tangible employ-
ment action' occurs when a supervisor abuses his authority to act on his
employer's behalf by threatening to fire a subordinate if she refuses to
participate in sexual acts with him, and then actually fires her when she
continues to resist his demands. 87 With this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit
joined the Second Circuit in holding that a tangible employment action
also occurs where a supervisor threatens the employee with discharge
and, in order to maintain employment, the employee submits to the su-
pervisor's sexual demands.8 8 As such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
an employer may not assert the Faragher/Ellerth defense when the su-
pervisor coerces an employee to submit to sexual advances under threats
of discharge, or discharges the employee for refusing to submit to such
advances. 89 The court reasoned that in either case, the supervisor has
80. Id. at 1163.
81. Id. at 1164. During this time, Holly D. and Wiggins engaged in various sexual activities
including both sexual intercourse and oral sex during office hours. Id.
82. Id. at 1165.
83. Id. at 1163.
84. Id. Holly D. alleged that Wiggins became more critical during those periods when she
rebuffed his advances and that she could neutralize his criticisms by submitting to his advances.
85. Id. at 1163-64.
86. Id. at 1165.
87. Id. at 1167.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1173.
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abused his authority in taking a tangible employment action against the
employee, which results in a significant injury to the employee.90
The Ninth Circuit explained that employees who submit to supervi-
sors' sexual harassment are subjected to the same abuse of authority as
are non-submissive employees. Thus, because discharge constitutes a
tangible employment action, so too should submission to sexual ad-
vances. 9 1 This is because in a submission case, as in a discharge case, the
supervisor successfully utilizes his authority in order to accomplish the
unlawful purpose of sexually harassing the employee.92 In exercising this
authority in a submission case, the supervisor conditions the employee's
continued employment upon her willingness to submit to his sexual ad-
vances. 93 Thus, participation in unwelcome sexual activities becomes a
condition of the employee's employment, which constitutes a substantial
change in the terms of that employment.94 As such, the substantial
change in the terms of employment constitutes a tangible employment
action.95
The Second and Ninth Circuits are the only two circuits to squarely
address whether voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances
constitutes a tangible employment action.96 Both the Second Circuit, in
Jin,97 and the Ninth Circuit, in Holly D.,g held that voluntary submission
to a supervisor's sexual advances does constitute a tangible employment
action, though the holdings do have their limitations. While the Ninth
Circuit held that a tangible employment action occurs where the em-
ployee voluntarily submits to the supervisor's sexual advances, it clearly
stressed that the employee must either present evidence that she was
threatened with termination if she failed to submit or must establish a
link between the submission to the supervisor's advances and an em-
ployment benefit, such as continued employment. 99 Thus, while the Jin
and Holly D. decisions may have an impact on an employer's ability to
assert the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense in voluntary submission
cases, the burden remains on the employee to present sufficient evidence
90. Id. The court reasoned that the injury in submission cases is the physical and emotional
damage that results from the employee's submission to unwelcome sexual advances as a condition of
continued employment. Id. at 1171.
91. Id. at 1168-69.
92. Id. at 1169.
93. Id
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2002); Holly D., 339 F.3d 1158.
97. Jin, 310 F.3d at 98-99.
98. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1181.
99. Id. at 1173.
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that either her employment was threatened if she refused to submit or
that her continued employment was conditioned upon the submission.
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part will focus first on the potential impact that the Jin and
Holly D. decisions will have on employers. Second, it will analyze the
problems presented by these decisions including: their inconsistency with
Supreme Court precedent and, how these decisions undermine the doc-
trine of avoidable consequences. Third, it will address the appropriate
standard for determining employer liability in submission cases. This
Part will conclude by discussing imposition of individual liability in
submission cases.
A. The Impact of Jin and Holly D. on Employers
Employers may be liable for a supervisor's harassment that creates
a hostile work environment, subject to the affirmative defense estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Faragherl°° and Ellerth.'0 However,
where the supervisor's actions culminate in a tangible employment ac-
tion, the employer may not assert the affirmative defense. 10 2 The Second
and Ninth Circuits' decisions in Jin and Holly D. indicate the courts'
willingness to broaden the scope of those actions that may properly con-
stitute a tangible employment action for purposes of Title VII liability.I°3
As such, these recent decisions will have a significant impact on employ-
ers because these decisions greatly expand the number of situations in
which an employer may be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's sex-
ual harassment.104
100. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
101. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1998).
102. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761i-63; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777-78.
103. Additionally, a recent Second Circuit decision indicates a willingness to broaden the defi-
nition of the term "supervisor" for purposes of Title VII liability. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326
F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2003). The courts' willingness to broaden the definition of "supervisor"
means that many more employees will qualify as supervisors, and employers without sexual harass-
ment policies in place will be held vicariously liable for the acts of these employees.
104. Title VII does not define "supervisor." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e is the "definitions" section for
Title VII; subsection (b) defines the term "employer." However, in most cases decided in recent
years-prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Mack-the term "supervisor" has been narrowly
defined as an individual having "significant control over the [employee's] hiring, firing, or condi-
tions of employment." Parkins v. Civil Constr. of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court's failure in Faragher and Ellerth to establish a test for courts
to use in determining whether a particular employee qualifies as a "supervisor," as well as Title VII's
lack of a definition of that term, has resulted in confusion as to who qualifies as a supervisor for
purposes of Title VII liability. In April 2003, the Second Circuit, in applying the holdings in
Faragher and Ellerth, arrived at a new standard for determining who qualifies as a supervisor for
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The decisions in Jin and Holly D. have made periodic harassment
training of all employees essential. The courts' willingness to expand
those actions necessarily expands the realm of potential liability expo-
sure for the employer, thus limiting the situations where an employer
may assert the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to employee sexual
harassment claims brought under Title VII.
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits 'Decisions are Problematic
The decisions of the Second Circuit in Jin and the Ninth Circuit in
Holly D. present several problems. First, they are inconsistent with prior
Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of tangible employment
actions. Second, the decisions undermine the concept of an employee
having a parallel duty to avoid injury in situations involving the em-
ployee's voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances.
1. The Second and Ninth Circuits' Decisions are Inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's Definition of Tangible Employment Action
The Second and Ninth Circuits' decisions are inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's prior definition of tangible employment action1 °5 be-
cause historically, the Supreme Court has limited a tangible employment
action to situations where "a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits" occurs.10 6 While the Court's list is not exhaustive, 0 7 the actions
in both Jin and Holly D. fall outside of the scope of its definition.
Maintenance of the status quo is insufficient to automatically sub-
ject an employer to vicarious liability under Faragher and Ellerth, even
when employees maintained their employment by submitting to the ad-
vances of their supervisors, as was claimed in Jin and Holly D. 10 8 Under
purposes of Title VII liability. Mack, 326 F.3d at 126-127. The test established by the Second Cir-
cuit premises liability on "whether the authority given by the employer to the employee enabled or
materially augmented the ability of the latter to create a hostile work environment for his or her
subordinates." Id. at 126. In other words, if, because of an individual's position, it becomes signifi-
cantly easier for a harasser to accomplish the harassment, the individual is defined as a supervisor
and the employer will be subject to vicarious liability for that individual's acts.
105. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (defining "tangible employment action").
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2002).
108. The circumstances in Jin and Holly D. may appear to be analogous to what the Court
found actionable in Meritor. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73 (1986). Im-
portantly, however, Meritor was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and
Ellerth. This Article does not necessarily argue that the decision in Meritor was incorrect, but rather
advocates that an employer should have an opportunity to assert the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative
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Ellerth, a "significant change in status" is required for a tangible em-
ployment action. 10 9 Continuing to work the same job, receive the same
pay and benefits, and undertake the same responsibilities is not a change
in status, and thus is not analogous to any of the examples of tangible
employment action provided by the Court in either Ellerth or
Faragher."° Moreover, no detrimental employment effects arise from
the submission when the status quo is maintained, and therefore there is
no tangible employment action taken by the employer."' The Supreme
Court has clearly stated that if the supervisor takes no specific job action,
then the employer will not be strictly liable for the supervisor's con-
duct." 2 In both Jin and Holly D., the supervisor took no specific job ac-
tion.
Furthermore, voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual ad-
vances does not constitute a tangible employment action because a tangi-
ble employment action requires "an official act of the enterprise, a com-
pany act."'1 3 A supervisor often acts on behalf of the company in the
course of his professional duties. However, the harassing supervisor is
acting on personal motives unrelated to, and often antithetical to, the ob-
jectives of the employer. Accordingly, such acts should not be found to
be within the scope of the supervisor's employment and should not be
imputed to the employer.1 4 Where an employer has no knowledge of the
harassment, a court cannot logically deem the supervisor's actions to be
an official act of the employer. The Second and Ninth Circuits, however,
defense not only because defining voluntary submission as a "tangible employment action" is incon-
sistent with the definition set forth by the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth, but also because
when the employee submits to the advances, the employee thereby implies that the advances were
not unwelcome. As previously acknowledged, this proposal presents a radical departure from exist-
ing legal assumptions about sexual harassment law. However, this proposal is fully consistent with
the Supreme Court's decisions defining the scope of "tangible employment actions." See Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 761. Importantly, under the standard proposed in this Article, Meritor may have been
decided differently. This proposal would have required the employee in Meritor to report the sexu-
ally harassing conduct or overcome the burden of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. As such,
the employee in Meritor would have had to prove that the bank failed to exercise reasonable care to
promptly prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff had a reasonable
explanation for failing to take advantage of the preventative and corrective opportunities provided by
the bank. See id. at 765. Regardless, under this standard, the bank would have been entitled to the
opportunity to assert the affirmative defense, which may have allowed it to prove that the supervi-
sor's advances were not truly unwelcome by the employee.
109. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 765.
113. Id. at 762.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235, illus. 2 (1958) (stating that a tort commit-
ted while acting purely from personal ill will is not within the scope of employment).
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have concluded that the tangible employment action in submission cases
is the retention of employment." 5 The conclusion of these courts is
flawed.
In those instances where a tangible employment action has oc-
curred, the decision usually will be documented in official company re-
cords and may be subject to review by higher-level supervisors. 1 6 Addi-
tionally, as the Ellerth court held, "the supervisor often must obtain the
imprimatur of the enterprise and use its internal processes."' 7 This
clearly distinguishes a submission case from those actions typically
found to constitute a tangible employment action. As stated by the Ninth
Circuit:
[I]t is rare that a supervisor's demands for sexual liberties, and the
corresponding threat of adverse consequences for failure to submit,
will be documented anywhere in company records. Therefore, a rule
requiring a victimized employee who submits to a supervisor's in-
decent demand for sexual favors to prove an official company act in
order to establish a tangible employment action strains common118sense.
This is precisely why the employer should not be precluded from
use of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. In the typical "tangible
employment action"-actions found to constitute tangible employment
actions prior to the decisions in Jin and Holly D.-there is typically
documentation for the action taken by the employer, and this documenta-
tion puts the mark of the employer on the supervisor's actions. Con-
versely, there is no documentation in a submission case; at least on this
point, submission cases are thus more similar to hostile environment
claims, where the affirmative defense is available to the employer, than
they are similar to instances of hiring, firing, demoting, or transferring an
employee who fails to submit, where the affirmative defense is not avail-
able.
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court stated that a threat of a job detriment
without an actual job detriment imposed by the supervisor is more pre-
cisely a claim for hostile work environment. 1 9 That is precisely the situa-
tion in a submission case prior to the employee's decision to submit.
115. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2002); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of
Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1181 .(9th Cir. 2003).
116. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
117. Id.
118. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Suders v.
Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 458-59 (3d Cir. 2003)).
119. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 743.
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Thus, submission cases are more similar to unfulfilled threat cases (i.e.,
hostile environment claims) and as such should be subjected to the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.
An employee faced with a threat that her employment may be af-
fected if she does not submit to the supervisor's sexual advances is in a
situation more appropriate for a hostile work environment claim, as no
tangible employment action has been taken against the employee. On the
other hand, the Second and Ninth Circuits found that, in submission
cases, once the employee submits to the supervisor's sexual advances,
the situation changes and a tangible employment action has occurred.1 20
This is contradictory. Not only is it pure speculation as to whether
the supervisor would actually follow through with any alleged threats, it
is the action of the employee in deciding to submit to the advances that
results in what the Second and Ninth Circuits have found to be the tangi-
ble employment action, not the decision of the employer. This conclusion
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's definition of a tangible em-
ployment action. 121
A simple illustration will demonstrate this anomalous result. A su-
pervisor makes sexual advances toward an employee and the employee
refuses these advances. Nonetheless, the supervisor continues to make
advances toward the employee. If the employee brings a Title VII claim
at this point, the claim would be subject to the Faragher/Ellerth affirma-
tive defense because no tangible employment action has yet been taken.
However, if, instead of filing a Title VII claim, the employee submits to
the supervisor's advances and then subsequently files a claim, the em-
ployer is precluded from asserting the affirmative defense. Under the
decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits, once the employee submits, a
tangible employment action has occurred. It is counterintuitive to allow
the employee to preclude the employer from asserting the affirmative
defense by submitting to the advances instead of reporting the conduct to
the employer. As such, submission cases should be treated similarly to
unfulfilled threat or hostile environment claims, as that is exactly what
this situation would be before the employee makes the decision to submit
to the advances. 22
120. See Holly D.,339 F.3d at 1173.
121. While the counter-argument may be that the requisite employer action is within the em-
ployer's grant of coercive power to the supervisor, thus enabling the supervisor to then misuse that
power to harass the employee, the employer has also granted a power to the employee by which to
eliminate the harassment. The power granted to the employee is set forth in the employer's policies
and procedures to encourage the employee to inform it that a problem exists.
122. Again, this argument may appear to be similar to the argument made by the employer and
rejected by the Court in Meritor that, because the employee voluntarily submitted to the supervisor's
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It is unreasonable for the court to hold the employer liable for the
employee's decision to submit to the advances rather than to follow the
policies and procedures the employer has put into place to safeguard
against liability if an employee believes she is being sexually harassed.
While the harassing conduct may be an act of the supervisor, the decision
to submit is an act of the employee for which the employer should not be
held vicariously liable. Up until the point where the employee decides to
submit, the employer is entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative de-
fense. The same should hold true after the employee decides to submit. A
contrary decision allows the law to change based upon the decision of the
employee. Importantly, the decisions set forth by the Second and Ninth
Circuits allow the employee to control the decision and outcome of the
case. Not only do these decisions allow the employer's fate to hinge on
the employee's decision, they also affect the employer's ability to defend
itself by precluding the use of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in a submission case, the threat is
not unfulfilled or inchoate, but is implemented when the supervisor actu-
ally coerces sex by abusing the employer's authority, thus making the
condition of employment he has imposed concrete. 123 The court deter-
mined that the threat culminates in a "tangible employment action," be-
cause the employee maintains her employment as a result of submitting
to her supervisor's advances. 24 In fact, this is not true. The threat is un-
fulfilled or inchoate until the employee determines that it would be more
beneficial to submit to the advances than to follow the procedures set
forth by the employer to eliminate any such harassing conduct.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit stated that, "if a supervisor commits a
'tangible employment action' by 'firing' an employee because she re-
fuses to enter into a sexual relationship, a 'tangible employment action'
must also occur when he determines not to fire her because she has per-
formed the sexual acts he demanded.' 2 5 This inquiry is too fact intensive
to simply assume, thereby imposing vicarious liability on the employer,
that the supervisor would have actually acted upon the threats. This is a
question of fact which should be determined on a case-by-case basis and
subject to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. While there is al-
sexual advances, the employer should not be held liable. However, the fact that the employee makes
the decision to submit to the advances, thereby foregoing the policies and procedures implemented
by the employer to discourage sexually harassing conduct, implies that the employee consents to the
relationship. Therefore, if the relationship is consensual, it is welcome and thus not actionable.
123. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1170.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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ways a question of fact about the consensual nature of the relationship,
where an employer has a policy in place to stop the alleged harassment,
then it should be presumed that the employee entered into the relation-
ship consensually. It further defies common sense to assume that the em-
ployee might feel comfortable making a claim of sexual harassment for
not receiving a promotion while being uncomfortable making a claim of
forced participation in unwanted sexual acts with a supervisor.
The Second and Ninth Circuits' holdings that voluntary submission
to a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a tangible employment ac-
tion are incorrect, as a decision by an employee clearly does not fall
within the realm of "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits" as set forth by the Supreme Court in Ellerth.126 Ac-
cordingly, these decisions are inconsistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent.
2. These Decisions Undermine the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine
The Supreme Court's stated goal in Faragher and Ellerth was to
balance agency principles of vicarious liability with Title VII's basic pol-
icy of encouraging employers to promulgate and enforce effective anti-
discrimination/harassment policies and encouraging employees to avoid
the harm caused by harassment and discrimination by quickly reporting
such misconduct.127 A victim of harassment has a duty to "use such
means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize
the damages that result from violations of the statute.' 28 The approach of
the Second and Ninth Circuits discourages employees from avoiding or
ending harassment and discrimination.
Under the approach taken by the Second and Ninth Circuits, an em-
ployee who is faced with the sexual advances of her supervisor fares bet-
ter by submitting to the sexual advances than by refusing the advances
and immediately reporting the harassment. This result seems contrary to
the balance enunciated by the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth.
Thus, an employee's continued employment after submitting to a super-
visor's sexual advances should not be found to constitute a tangible em-
ployment action. More importantly, submission to a supervisor's sexual
advances should not preclude the employer's use of the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense.
126. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
127. Id. at 764.
128. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n. 15 (1982).
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Part of the Ninth Circuit's decision was based upon the reasoning
that participation in unwanted sexual acts becomes a condition of the
employee's employment--"a critical condition that effects a substantial
change in the terms of that [employee's] employment."'' 29 However, this
cannot be true, as harassment would be eliminated if the employee were
to follow the proper course of procedures as set forth by company poli-
cies. Following the holdings of Jin and Holly D. would allow employees
to bypass procedures that the employer has put in place specifically to
address these very issues. Individuals must be held accountable for their
actions. The decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits fail to hold the
individual employees accountable for their actions, and this is a step in
the wrong direction.
Furthermore, under the approaches of the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits, an employer's sexual harassment policies would be rendered nulli-
ties, and employees would be discouraged from sanctioning a supervi-
sor's inappropriate conduct because only voluntary submission consti-
tutes a tangible employment action. Sexual harassment policies encour-
age employees to report instances of harassment immediately to deter
future occurrences. 130 Such policies also provide employers with notice
of inappropriate conduct. 13' The approaches of the Second and Ninth
Circuits discourage employees from reporting a supervisor's inappropri-
ate behavior. To keep the balance and promote timely reporting, an em-
ployer should be entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense
when a harassment claim involves an employee's voluntary submission
to a supervisor's sexual advances.
The Second and Ninth Circuits accept the argument that in a sub-
mission case, the employee voluntarily submits to a supervisor's sexual
advances in order to avoid the threat of being discharged for refusal to
submit. 32 However, submitting to a supervisor's sexual advances out of
threat of discharge is not an argument that should expose an employer to
vicarious liability.'33 It follows that a threat of termination, without more,
is not enough to excuse an employee from following procedures adopted
129. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1169.
130. Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
131. Id.
132. However, a "generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual har-
assment." Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001).
133. Of course, when a supervisor threatens termination, an employee may reasonably fear
retaliation. To be sure, harassing supervisors often threaten termination in order to intimidate and
manipulate their victims. Effective complaint procedures are designed to protect against precisely
such retaliatory conduct. They are intended to divest a harassing supervisor of any power he has over
the victimized employee.
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for her protection. To hold otherwise would render the affirmative de-
fense meaningless. A more logical conclusion would be that the em-
ployee should be required to report the harassment in order to prevent the
threat.134 Requiring the employee to report the harassment is consistent
with Title VII's policy of deterring sexual harassment and implementing
proper workplace safeguards.
Title VII was specifically designed to encourage harassed employ-
ees to report their harassers on the belief that doing so benefits every-
body. Reporting the alleged harassment benefits the victim by allowing
the company to eliminate the threat of future harassment. Reporting also
benefits others who might be harassed by the same individual, and it
benefits the company by alerting it to the disruptive and unlawful con-
duct of the supervisor. Thus, to require an employee who feels threatened
by a supervisor's sexual advances to report the conduct serves the pri-
mary objective of Title VII, which "is not to provide redress but to avoid
harm." 135
An employee's subjective belief in the futility of reporting a ha-
rasser's behavior is not a reasonable basis for failing to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. 36
Title VII expressly prohibits any retaliation against an employee for re-
porting harassment.' 37 Allowing subjective fears to vitiate an employee's
reporting requirement would completely undermine Title VII's basic pol-
icy of encouraging forethought by employers. 138 The law against sexual
harassment is not self-enforcing; an employer cannot be expected to cor-
rect harassment unless the employee makes a concerted effort to inform
the employer that a problem exists. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court said
that an employee has a duty to alert the employer to any harassing con-
duct occurring in the workplace. 139 The courts cannot allow an employee
to subvert this duty by submitting to, instead of reporting, a supervisor's
sexual advances.
134. See Mandray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 1998),
(stating that "[t]o permit an employee to disregard a policy of which she was admittedly aware based
on generalized fears would require an employer to be automatically liable for harassment committed
by a supervisor. This is a result which the Supreme Court expressly sought to avoid.").
135. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742, 806 (1998).
136. Barrett, 240 F.3d at 268.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
138. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764
(1998).
139. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
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C. The Appropriate Standard in Determining Employer Liability
A negligence standard, rather than vicarious liability, is the appro-
priate standard in a submission case. Although a supervisor's status
might facilitate the harassment for which an employer may be held vi-
cariously liable, this is no reason for precluding the employer from as-
serting the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense:1 40 an employee should
not be entitled to hold an employer responsible for the hostile workplace
environment unless the employee can show that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and nonetheless failed to take
prompt remedial action. Liability in submission cases should be deter-
mined using the same negligence standard used in other hostile environ-
ment claims, thereby entitling the employer to the opportunity to assert
and prove the affirmative defense to liability.
An employer should be allowed to prove that it did not implicitly or
explicitly aid the supervisor's misconduct. If a supervisor imposes a job
detriment, then under any theory of agency law, an employer would be
liable because the employer has implicitly given its imprimatur to the
supervisor's conduct. On the other hand, when a supervisor's conduct
does not result in a tangible action, like in the case of submission, the
employer's approval or acquiescence is not easily determined. Condi-
tioning employer liability at least in part on its own action or inaction
should encourage employers to adopt effective anti-harassment policies.
The employee can demonstrate that the employer knew of the har-
assment by showing that she complained to higher management of the
harassment. 14 1 When an employer has promulgated a sexual harassment
policy specifying the steps a victimized employee should take to alert the
employer of the harassment, the employer is deemed to have notice of
the harassment sufficient to obligate it or its agents to take prompt and
appropriate remedial measures when the employee who alleges harass-
ment makes "reasonably sufficient use of the channels created by the
policy.' 142
The more appropriate standard in determining employer liability in
a submission case is a negligence standard, subject to the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. Title VII was designed to encour-
age the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms. To the extent limiting employer liability could encourage
140. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003).
141. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11 th Cir. 1982).
142. Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1364 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
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employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or per-
vasive, it would also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose.
D. Imposition of Individual Liability in Submission Cases
Title VII does not afford monetary relief against a supervisor, even
when the supervisor is the person who engaged in the underlying, wrong-
ful conduct.143 However, because one of the primary purposes of Title
VII is to prevent discrimination, it is anomalous to encourage the preven-
tion of discrimination while at the same time allowing the individual who
is guilty of inflicting the discriminatory or harassing conduct to escape
liability. Therefore, the better approach is to hold a supervisor jointly
and/or severally liable with the employer for the harassing conduct. Ohio
courts assign liability this way, so the approach is not novel.' 44 The legis-
lature should amend Title VII to incorporate this same approach in all
cases involving discriminatory or harassing conduct by a supervisor. 145
This proposal of joint and/or several liability is predicated on the
assumption that responsibility for voluntary relationships should be
vested primarily in the supervisors and subordinates who form them, and
not (in most cases) in employers. This does not mean, however, that an
employee coerced into a sexual relationship with a supervisor should
have no legal recourse. Title VII should be amended to permit individual
liability in sexual harassment cases, so that such an employee may sue
the supervisor directly. Liability should follow responsibility.
In Genaro v. Central Transport, Inc., the Ohio Supreme Court held
that under chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code, Ohio's anti-
discrimination statute, a supervisor may be jointly and/or severally liable
with his or her employer for the discriminatory or harassing conduct of
the supervisor. 146 The Ohio Supreme Court held so even though federal
case law interpreting and applying Title VII is generally applicable to
cases involving chapter 4112.147 Chapter 4112, section 02 of the Ohio
Revised Code, phrased similarly to Title VII, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For any em-
ployer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
143. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003).
144. E.g., Genaro v. Cent. Transp. Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999).
145. Although this approach is used in Ohio courts, this is not the view followed by the Sixth
Circuit, of which Ohio is a part. E.g., Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that an individual employee/supervisor may not be held personally liable under Title VII).
146. 703 N.E.2d at 787-88.
147. Id. at 784. See also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Ingram, 630 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ohio
1994).
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handicap, age, or ancestry, . . . of a person to discriminate against
that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment or any matter directly related to employ-
ment. 14 8
Under the statute, "employer" is defined as "any person employing
four or more persons within the state, and any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer."' 149 Furthermore, the term "per-
son" is defined as including "one or more individuals.., agent, and em-
ployee., 150 The Ohio Supreme Court determined that, by its very lan-
guage, the statute encompasses individual supervisors whose conduct
violates the provisions of chapter 4112.151
Moreover, the court reasoned that holding supervisors individually
liable for their discriminatory actions facilitates the anti-discriminatory
purposes of chapter 4112, thereby furthering the public policy goals re-
garding workplace discrimination.152 Because the purposes behind chap-
ter 4112-purposes of avoiding discrimination-are similar to those of
Title VII, legislators should follow the example set by the Ohio Supreme
Court and draft legislation incorporating individual liability provisions
for supervisors to ensure that the purposes of Title VII are fulfilled. The
approach followed by the Ohio Supreme Court more effectively serves
Title VII's deterrent purpose than does the approach currently followed
in the federal court system of limiting liability solely to the employer.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article does not argue that an employer should not be held li-
able for the acts of its supervisors. This Article simply argues that in
submission cases, the employer should be entitled to assert the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. An employer should not be held
vicariously liable for an employee's voluntary submission to sexual ad-
vances simply because the alleged harasser is a supervisor. Instead, li-
ability under these circumstances should be determined on a case-by-case
basis using a negligence standard. Additionally, where voluntary submis-
sion is involved, the courts should impose individual liability instead of
vicarious liability.
The proposals in this Article are somewhat radical, as they present a
marked departure from existing assumptions regarding sexual harass-
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (West 2005).
149. 1d. § 4112.01(A)(2) (emphasis added).
150. Id. § 4112.01(A)(]).
151. Genaro, 703 N.E.2d at 785.
152. Id.
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ment. Nonetheless, while this proposal goes against the grain of the cases
analyzed and takes a stance different from most scholarly articles on this
topic, the departure is balanced by imposing joint and/or several liability
on the supervisor for his discriminatory or harassing conduct.
Importantly, this proposal is fully consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions defining the scope of "tangible employment ac-
tions.,,153 The imposition of individual liability against a negligence stan-
dard, rather than a blanket denial of affirmative defenses, should be and
indeed may very well be how the Supreme Court would ultimately rule if
it were directly faced with the question of whether an employee's volun-
tary submission to a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a tangible
employment action.
153. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
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